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Water problems are typically studied at the level of the river catchment. About 70% of all
water is used for agriculture, and agricultural products are traded internationally. A full
understanding of water use is impossible without understanding the international market
for food and related products, such as textiles. The water embedded in commodities is
called virtual water. Based on a general equilibrium model, we offer a method for
investigating the role of water resources and water scarcity in the context of international
trade. We run five alternative scenarios, analyzing the effects of water scarcity due to
reduced availability of groundwater. This can be a consequence of physical constraints, and
of policies curbing water demand. Four scenarios are based on a ‘‘market solution’’, where
water owners can capitalize their water rent or taxes are recycled. In the fifth ‘‘non-market’’
scenario, this is not the case; supply restrictions imply productivity losses. Restrictions in
water supply would shift trade patterns of agriculture and virtual water. These shifts are
larger if the restriction is larger, and if the use of water in production is more rigid. Welfare
losses are substantially larger in the non-market situation. Water-constrained agricultural
producers lose, but unconstrained agricultural produces gain; industry gains as well. As a
result, there are regional winners and losers from water supply constraints. Because of the
current distortions of agricultural markets, water supply constraints could improve
allocative efficiency; this welfare gain may more than offset the welfare losses due to the
resource constraint.
& 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.r Ltd. All rights reserved.
l Research Institute, Whitaker Square, Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, Dublin 2, Ireland.
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Water is one of our basic resources, but it is often short.
Estimates have shown that the total amount of water
available would be sufficient to provide the present world
population only with a minimum amount of freshwater
required. However, the uneven distribution of water (and
population) among regions has made the adequate supply
critical for a growing number of countries. A rapid population
growth and an increasing consumption of water per capita
has aggravated the problem. This tendency is likely to
continue as water consumption for most uses is projected
to increase by at least 50% by 2025 compared to 1995 level
(Rosegrant et al., 2002). One additional reason for concern is
(anthropogenic) climate change, which may lead to increased
drought in many places (IPCC, 2001).
Water problems are typically defined and studied at the
level of the river catchment, if not at a finer spatial scale. This
is a valid approach for many applications. Yet, 70% of all
water is used for agriculture, and agricultural products are
traded internationally. A complete understanding of water
use is therefore impossible without understanding the
international markets for food and other agriculture related
products, such as textiles. This study offers a method of
studying the role of water resources and water scarcity in the
context of international trade.
Previous studies have introduced the term ‘‘virtual water’’
to indicate the implicit water content of internationally
traded commodities. Virtual water is the water used in
production, rather than the water contained in the product,
and virtual water export (import) is the water used to produce
exported (imported) goods (Allan, 1992, 1993). Water con-
tained in the product is a fraction of the water used in
production. For example, Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004)
calculate a global virtual water flow of 16% of total global
water use. However, these studies are descriptive: virtual
water flows are estimated, but changes in either water
resources or economic circumstances cannot be readily
assessed. In contrast, our model allows for the analysis of
virtual water flows for many scenarios, within a framework
consistent with economic theory. Furthermore, the model
belongs to a class of empirical tools (CGE), which has been
extensively used for trade liberalization, development, and
fiscal policy analysis.
Other studies, notably Rosegrant et al. (2002), use partial
equilibrium models for scenario studies. Our general equili-
brium approach allows for a richer set of economic feedbacks
and for a complete assessment of welfare implications, but
this of course comes at the price of a cruder resolution. The
analysis is based on countries’ total renewable water
resources and differences in water productivity. For example,
we account for the fact that growing wheat in North African
countries requires more water than growing it in the USA.
Also, different crop types have different water requirements:
the production of a ton of rice is more water intensive than
the production of a ton of wheat. Within the GTAP regions, we
use the crop-value-weighted average of national estimates.
In this paper, we present a computable general equilibrium
model, especially designed to account for water resources(GTAP-W), and illustrate its potential application for sustain-
able water supply uses. Section 2 reviews the literature,
highlighting the original contribution of our model, which
appears to be truly the first global, multi-regional, multi-
sectoral trade model with virtual water flows and water as a
factor of production. The model is a first step in improving
our understanding of the interactions between water re-
source and international trade in agricultural products.
Because the temporal and spatial resolution is course, and
the data are crude, the model cannot be used directly for
advice on water policy. Section 3 presents the model and the
data on water resources and use, and discusses the limita-
tions of the data and the model. The basic model and
economic data are derived from the Global Trade and Analysis
Project (http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/). The water sa-
tellite accounts can be found at http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/
GTAP-EF-W.5680.0.html
Section 4 discusses five alternative scenarios. Section 5
analyses the results. Section 6 discusses and concludes.2. Previous studies
As the supply of water is limited, attempts have been made to
economize on the consumption of water, especially in regions
where the supply is critical (Seckler et al., 1998; Dinar and
Yaron, 1992). However, in many regions water is subsidized
(Rosegrant et al., 2002). An alternative strategy to meet the
increasing demand for water is the desalination of brackish or
sea water (Ettouney et al., 2002; Zhou and Tol, 2005).
Another possibility to minimize water use in water-short
countries is to increase imports of products that require a lot
of water in their production. The water embedded in
commodities is also called virtual water (Allan, 1992, 1993).
We use the production site definition, that is, we consider the
actual water used in production. The virtual water content of
a product can also be defined as the volume of water that
would have been required to produce the product in the place
where it is consumed (consumption site specific definition). A
recent study by the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education
on global virtual water trade, for the period 1997–2001,
revealed that in order to produce e.g. 1 ton of husked rice,
on average 3000m3 of virtual water are necessary; this is the
world average; the number varies from 1600m3/ton in Japan
and the USA to 4000m3/ton. In Brazil (see Chapagain and
Hoekstra, 2004; see also Hoekstra and Hung, 2003, 2005;
Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2003). For livestock products the
numbers are much higher. Due to differences in climate
conditions and animal diets, the water use numbers differ
significantly between countries. Other studies may have
different numbers for particular crops or particular countries.
The main advantage of using the Chapagain and Hoekstra
(2004) data is that it covers all crops and all countries in an
internally consistent way.
According to Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004), 61% of the
global virtual water trade is related to international trade in
crops, 17% is related to trade in livestock and livestock
products and only 22% is related to trade in industrial
products. In total, 16% of water used in the world for
agricultural and industrial production is exported as virtual
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and Thailand are the biggest net exporters of virtual water,
whereas Japan, Italy, UK, Germany and South Korea are the
biggest net importers. If these figures are weighted against a
country’s endowment of water resources the picture is quite
different. In relative terms, countries in the Middle East and
North Africa import a lot of virtual water. On the other hand,
USA, Canada, South America and Australia are exporting a
significant share of their water resources.
As the water requirement for food production is large,
virtual water might be seen as an additional source of water
for water-scarce countries. Indeed, much of the existing
literature stresses the political relevance and emphasizes the
role of virtual water in providing food security in water-short
regions (Bouwer, 2000; Allan and Olmsted, 2003). Some
researchers have even argued that virtual water trade could
perhaps prevent wars over water (Allan, 1997; Homer-Dixon,
1994, would disagree). Others fear that regions become
dependent on global trade and vulnerable to market fluctua-
tions. However, most countries have no explicit strategy for
virtual water trade (Yang and Zehnder, 2002). Another branch
of the literature has compared the concept of virtual water
trade to the economic concept of comparative advantages
(see e.g. Wichelns, 2001, 2004; Hakimian, 2003), but the data
show little correlation between the virtual water trade
balance and water endowments (Wichelns, 2004; Ramirez-
Vallejo and Rogers, 2004), probably because water is usually
not (fully) priced.
Although the concept of virtual water trade is appealing,
the number of empirical studies is limited. Renault (2003) and
Zimmer and Renault (2003) provide estimates on global
virtual water trade, one by the World Water Council (WWC),
in collaboration with the Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nation (FAO), see Oki et al. (2003). Although
different in data and methodology, results are close to the
ones obtained by the UNESCO-IHE. Others have investigated
why the virtual water trade balance is positive for some
countries and negative for others. Yang et al. (2003) found
evidence that virtual water import for cereals increases with
decreasing water resources. Hoekstra and Hung (2003, 2005)
compared water scarcity and water dependency and found
perhaps unexpected results for some countries: There is no
relationship between national water scarcity and virtual
water trade.
One aspect, which has not attracted much attention so far
are changes in virtual water trade over time. Yang et al. (2003)
used population predictions to calculate the annual water
deficit for water-scarce countries by 2030. Calculations are
based on cereal imports. Unsurprisingly, they found an
exponential increase. Rosegrant et al. (2002) used the
IMPACT-WATER model to estimate demand and supply of
food and water to 2025. Scenarios for water demand and
supply to 2025 are provided by Seckler et al. (1998). A detailed
analysis of the world water situation by 2025 is given by
Alcamo et al. (2000). In their most recent paper, Rosegrant et
al. (2002) include virtual water trade, using cereals as an
indicator (de Fraiture et al., 2004). Their results suggest that
the role of virtual water trade is modest, but these findings
have been obtained in a partial equilibrium analysis, in which
non-agricultural sectors are mainly excluded. Although mostwater is used in agriculture, shifts in agriculture would affect
other sectors, both domestically and internationally.
Studies using general equilibrium approaches typically
focus on a single country or region. Decaluwe et al. (1999)
analyze the effect of water pricing policies on demand and
supply of water in Morocco. Diao and Roe (2003) use an
intertemporal CGE model for Morocco, analyzing water and
trade policies. For the Arkansas River Basin, Goodman (2000)
shows that temporary water transfers are less costly than
building new dams. Go´mez et al. (2004) analyze the welfare
gains of improved allocation of water rights in the Balearic
Islands. These studies have an explicit representation of
water as a factor of production. Other studies use agricultural
productivity (e.g., Horridge et al., 2005) or land use as a proxy
for water (e.g., Seung et al., 2000). Letsoalo et al. (forthcoming)
treat water as a cost factor only.
Our analysis is different. In this paper, we include water as
an endowment in the production structure of the economy.
We use a computable general equilibrium model of the world
economy to analyze the implications of reduced supply of
water in water-scarce countries. Reduced water supply
necessarily implies that the relative price of water-intensive
products would increase, that the relative competitiveness of
all industries would change, and that the terms of trade of all
regions would shift, presumably to the benefit of water-
abundant regions. By focusing on single sectors or countries,
the above studies do not consider this. We consider various
scenarios, and study the effects on virtual water flows,
international trade, and welfare.
As the literature review above indicates, we are the first to
do this. Therefore, our results cannot be compared to earlier
model studies. Nor can our work be compared to empirical
work, as the wider economic implications of restrictions in
water supply have not been estimated. We present our data
and model in the next section. Because of lack of data, we
were unable to distinguish between rainfed and irrigated
agriculture. For the same reason, we were unable to allow the
agents to substitute away from water in production, although
they are of course able to substitute away from water-
intensive products. The paper should be seen as a first step.3. Modeling framework and data
In order to assess the systemic general equilibrium effects of
restricted water supply, we use a multi-region world CGE
model, called GTAP-W. The model is a refinement of the GTAP
model. The GTAP model is a standard CGE static model
distributed with the GTAP database of the world economy. For
detailed information see Hertel (1997) and the technical
references and papers available on the GTAP website
(www.gtap.org). We use the GTAP-E version modified by
Burniaux and Truong (2002). The GTAP variant developed by
Burniaux and Truong (2002) is best suited for the analysis of
energy markets and environmental policies. There are two
main changes in the basic structure. First, energy factors are
separated from the set of intermediate inputs and inserted in
a nested level of substitution with capital. This allows for
more substitution possibilities. Second, database and model
are extended to account for CO2 emissions related to energy
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trial and regional aggregation level, respectively, 17 sectors (6
of which in agriculture and forestry) and 16 regions, is
considered, and water resources, as non-marketed goods,
have been modeled. See Appendix ATable A1 for the regional,
sectoral and factor aggregations used in GTAP-W, some
characteristics are given in Table A2. The model is based on
1997 data. The crude regional and sectoral resolution make
that the quantitative insights of this paper are limited; the
contribution of this paper is qualitative and methodological.
As in all CGE models, the GTAP-W model makes use of the
Walrasian perfect competition paradigm to simulate adjust-
ment processes. Industries are modeled through a represen-
tative firm, which maximizes profits in perfectly competitive
markets. The production functions are specified via a series of
nested CES functions (Fig. A1 and Table A3 in Appendix A).
Domestic and foreign inputs are not perfect substitutes,
according to the so-called ‘‘Armington assumption’’, which
accounts for product heterogeneity.
A representative consumer in each region receives income,
defined as the service value of national primary factors
(natural resources, land, labor and capital). Capital and labor
are perfectly mobile domestically, but immobile internation-
ally. Land (imperfectly mobile) and natural resources are
industry-specific. The national income is allocated between
aggregate household consumption, public consumption and
savings (Fig. A2 in Appendix A). The expenditure shares are
generally fixed, which amounts to saying that the top level
utility function has a Cobb–Douglas specification. Private
consumption is split in a series of alternative composite
Armington aggregates. The functional specification used at
this level is the constant difference in elasticities (CDE) form:
a non-homothetic function, which is used to account for
possible differences in income elasticities for the various
consumption goods. A money metric measure of economic
welfare, the equivalent variation, can be computed from the
model output.
In the GTAP model and its variants, two industries are
treated in a special way and are not related to any region.
International transport is a world industry, which produces
the transportation services associated with the movement of
goods between origin and destination regions, thereby
determining the cost margin between f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices.
Transport services are produced by means of factors sub-
mitted by all countries, in variable proportions. In a similar
way, a hypothetical world bank collects savings from all
regions and allocates investments so as to achieve equality of
expected future rates of return.
In our modeling framework, water is combined with the
value-added-energy nest and the intermediate inputs as
displayed in Fig. A1 (Appendix A). As in the original GTAP
model, there is no substitutability between intermediate
inputs and value-added for the production function of
tradable goods and services. Therefore, a price-induced drop
in water demand does not imply an increase in any other
input. That is, water is a factor of production, but not a
substitutable one. In the benchmark equilibrium, water
supply is supposed to be unconstrained, so that water
demand is lower than water supply, and the price for
water is zero. Water is supplied to the agricultural industry,which includes primary crop production and livestock, and to
the water distribution services sector, which delivers water to
the rest of the economic sectors. Note that distributed water
can have a price, even if primary water resources are in
excess supply. Furthermore, water is mobile between the
different agricultural sectors. However, water is immobile
between agriculture and the water distribution services
sector, because the water treatment and distribution is very
different between agricultural and other uses. We change this
assumption in a sensitivity analysis.
The key parameter for the determination of regional water
use is the water intensity coefficient. This is defined as the
amount of water necessary for sector j to produce one unit of
commodity. This refers to water directly used in the produc-
tion process, not to the water indirectly needed to produce
other input factors. To estimate water intensity coefficients,
we first calculated total water use by commodity and country
for the year 1997. For the agricultural sector the FAOSTAT
database provided information on production of primary
crops and livestock. This includes detailed information on
different crop types and animal categories. Information on
water requirements for crop growth and animal feeding was
taken from Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004). This information
is provided as an average over the period from 1997 to 2001.
The CGE is calibrated for 1997. The water requirement
includes both the use of blue water (ground and surface
water) as well as green water (moisture stored in soil strata).
For crops it is defined as sum of water needed for evapo-
transpiration, from planting to harvest, and depends on crop
type and region. This procedure assumes that water is not
short and no water is lost by irrigation inefficiencies. For
animals, the virtual water content is mainly the sum of water
needed for feeding and drinking. The water intensity para-
meter for the water distribution sector is based on the
country’s industrial and domestic water use data provided
by AQUASTAT. This information is based on data for 2000. By
making use of this data we assume that domestic and
industrial water uses in 2000 are the same as in 1997.
The data we use are imperfect. Water use by crop is
uncertain, variable, and estimatedwith a rough methodology;
Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004) do not distinguish between
rainfed and irrigated agriculture. The AQUASTAT database
has similar problems for water use, as well as for water
resources. The FAOSTAT database on crop production has a
mix of high and low-quality data. Nonetheless, there are no
databases with equal coverage, both in countries and in crop
detail, and higher quality.
Themechanism through which water scarcity is introduced
into the model is the potential emergence of economic rents
associated with water resources. If supply falls short of
demand, consumers would be rationed, and willing to pay a
price to access to water, because water has an economic
value, as it is needed in production. If water resources are
privately or collectively owned, the owners receive an
economic rent, which becomes a component of available
income. The price for water is then set by the market at the
level that makes water demand compatible with supply. In
this setting, water supply is assumed to be completely
inelastic (vertical). By introducing technologies for ‘‘effective’’
water production, the supply function could, however, be
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Table 1 – Water price parameters
Agricultural
sectors
Water distribution
services
1.USA 0.14 0.72
2. CAN 0.08 0.53
3.WEU 0.04 0.45
4. JPK 0.06 0.45
5. ANZ 0.11 0.67
6. EEU 0.06 0.44
7. FSU 0.09 0.67
8.MDE 0.11 0.77
9. CAM 0.08 0.53
10. SAM 0.12 0.80
11. SAS 0.11 0.75
12. SEA 0.12 0.80
13. CHI 0.16 0.80
14.NAF 0.07 0.60
15. SSA 0.15 0.80
16. ROW 0.20 0.85
Source: our elaboration from Rosegrant et al. (2002).
WATER RESEARCH 41 (2007) 1799– 1813 1803positively sloped. Therefore, we introduce a constraint on
water amounts, in our model, which entails the creation of a
new market and a new exchangeable commodity.
Finally, we make the link between output levels and water
demand sensitive to water prices. In other words, we assume
that more expensive water brings about rationalization in
usage and substitution with other factors. The capability of
reducing the relative intensity of water demand is industry-
specific, and captured by a sector- and region-specific
parameter (see Table 1). Note that the parameters are little
more than informed guesses, derived from Rosegrant et al.
(2002). We report a sensitivity analysis below. Details are given
in Appendix B.1 The reduction is water supply is small relative to the annual
variation in precipitation. However, GTAP-W is a static compu-
table general equilibrium model. The reductions in water supply
are reductions in the long-term, average water supply.
2 Note that in this construction, the extent of technological
regress is endogenous, and therefore only implicitly determined
by the water supply constraint. That is, the change in water
supply is real, the change in productivity only a derivative.4. Design of simulation exercises
We run five alternative simulation exercises, all dealing with
the economic impacts of restricted water supply.
In particular, we deny the use of groundwater as a source of
water. There are two possible, alternative interpretations.
First, regulators can decide that groundwater should not be
pumped faster than it is replenished. Second, groundwater
resources can run dry. Pumping groundwater from aquifers at
a rate faster than it replenishes clearly violates sustainability
constraints. We subtract the excess use of groundwater from
the total amount of available water resources by country
(assumed to be equal to water demand in the calibration
year), as specified by FAO’s AQUASTAT database. Also, we add
sustainable water resources per basin, as specified by
Rosegrant et al. (2002). It turns out that water supply would
be restricted in four regions: North Africa (NAF), South Asia
(SAS), United States (USA) and China (CHI).
In the first four scenarios, we consider the ‘‘market
mechanism’’ to the problem of water scarcity. In the first
scenario, NAF is the region with the greatest assumeddecrease in water supply, facing a shortage of 10%. For the
other regions, the water supply constraints are less substan-
tial. In SAS and USA, water supply is assumed to decrease by
1.58%, and in CHINA by 3.92%.1 Scenario 2 can be regarded as
an example of what would happen to an economy when
sustainable water supply policies are delayed, and unex-
pected and severe shortages in water availability occur. In this
scenario, NAF faces an instantaneous shortage of 44% (the
water supply constraints in the other regions do not change).
Scenarios 3 and 4 are both variants of scenario 1. In scenario
3, we assume that water is specific to each agricultural sector,
that is, water is not mobile between the agricultural sectors.
In scenario 4, water use is not sensitive to the price.
The main limitation of the market approach is given by the
implicit assumption that property rights on water resources
can be defined and enforced, which is not always the case.
Rights to irrigation water may be explicit, but rights to
rainwater are an implicit part of land title. Water rights and
land titles are not necessarily secure, and capital markets are
not accessible to all. For this reason, in scenario 5, we provide
an alternative mechanism that does not require the creation
of a competitive market. When water gets scarce, but there is
no way of buying more water on the market, the main effect
will be a reduction of production for the same level of non-
water factor inputs. This is equivalent to a drop in productiv-
ity in water demanding industries. The fall in productivity
also makes produced goods more expensive, reducing their
demand and, indirectly, that for water.2 This scenario uses
the same constraints as in scenario one.
There is an alternative interpretation. Above, we assume
that the water supply is constrained. In the market scenarios
(1–4), the water users can reap the increase in rent due to the
restriction on the resources; in the non-market scenario (5),
the water users cannot use this rent, for instance because
water property rights are implicit and cannot be used as
assets on the capital market. In the alternative interpretation,
the regulator restricts water supply by imposing a tax. In
scenarios 1–4, the tax is recycled to the water users
proportional to their water use, but lump sum. An individual
water user can control her water use, and hence her total
water charge; however, the tax rebate depends on all water
users and is beyond the control of an individual water user.
Under these assumptions, the tax is neutral in the govern-
ment budget, and the ratio of private to public consumption is
preserved. In scenario 5, the tax money is not recycled.
Economically, and in our model, the two interpretations are
equivalent: ‘‘restricted water supply plus higher water rents’’
equals ‘‘water tax plus lump sum recycling’’ (scenarios 1–4);
‘‘restricted water supply but no higher water rents’’ equals
‘‘water tax without recycling’’ equals ‘‘reduction of land
productivity’’ (scenario 5). The interpretations are not the
same from an environmental policy perspective; in the first
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pretation, the water is there but cannot be used by humans.
Note that the data combine rainfall and irrigation water. For
irrigation water, it is straightforward to picture water rights
and water rents. For rainfall, the property right on water is
implicitly captured by the property right on the land on which
the rain falls. If water would be scarcer, the value of both
irrigation water and rainfall would increase. This water rent
would express itself as an increase in the value of water rights
in the case of irrigated agriculture; and as an increase in the
value of land in the case of rainfed agriculture. See
Mendelsohn et al. (1994) and Schlenker et al. (2005) for
empirical evidence.5. Simulation results
Results for all scenarios described in Section 4 are presented
in Tables 2–7. The tables report values for some key economic
variables: water demand, water rent, virtual water trade
balance, trade balance, welfare indexes. Scenario 1 is our base
scenario; comparison is done to scenario 1; scenario 1 is
compared to the situation without restrictions on water
supply.
In scenario 1, reported in Table 2, we simulate water
reductions in NAF, CHI, USA and SAS. The difference in water
rent between agriculture and the water distribution services
is due to the fact that water distribution is much more
responsive to price changes than the agricultural sector (see
Table 1). Note that, although USA and SAS face the same
water supply constraint, water prices are higher in the USA
(0.9 Cent/m3 versus 0.5 Cent/m3). However, SAS uses almostTable 2 – Scenario 1: water supply constraints
Water
demand
(%)
Water rent (million $ per billion
m3 of water)
Agricultural
sector
Water
distribution
USA 1.58 9.17 3.80
CAN 1.87 0.00 0.00
WEU 0.49 0.00 0.00
JPK 0.25 0.00 0.00
ANZ 3.20 0.00 0.00
EEU 0.17 0.00 0.00
FSU 0.41 0.00 0.00
MDE 0.79 0.00 0.00
CAM 0.69 0.00 0.00
SAM 0.46 0.00 0.00
SAS 1.58 4.52 0.30
SEA 0.18 0.00 0.00
CHI 3.92 28.60 1.17
NAF 10.00 5.45 2.47
SSA 0.59 0.00 0.00
ROW 0.21 0.00 0.00twice the amount of water in the baseline compared to the
USA (compare Table A2 in Appendix A). Also, CHI has a
significant lower water supply constraint than NAF, but its
water rent is higher (3 Cent/m3) than in NAF (0.5 Cent/m3).
These differences cannot be explained in terms of differences
in water price sensitivity (see Table 1). Nonetheless, there are
two ways to reduce the amount of water demand: reducing
water in water-demanding industries, and reducing demand
for goods produced with water. This latter, indirect water
demand reduction may be achieved in two ways: substitution
in production and consumption with other goods, and
substitution with goods of the same type, but produced
abroad. Additional imports, however, require an expansion of
exports in other industries and/or an increase of foreign
direct investments. Results suggest that this indirect demand
reduction is the primary determinant of prices in water
markets.
In terms of virtual water trade, as expected, less water
supply leads to an increase in virtual water import in the
constrained regions, and to a decrease in virtual water
exports. This is due to the relatively more expensive produc-
tion of water intensive goods and services in the constrained
regions. Water-short countries can meet their demand of
water-intensive products by importing them (Bouwer, 2000;
Allan and Olmsted, 2003). On the other hand, a deficit in
terms of virtual water trade is not always accompanied by a
negative variation in the trade balance. For example, in NAF,
SAS and CHI the trade balance improves.
Global welfare falls as production is constrained. Some
unconstrained regions gain, however, as their competitive
position in agriculture improves. More importantly, agricul-
tural prices increase relative to industrial prices, benefitingVirtual
water
trade
balance
(change in
billion m3)
GDP (%) Trade
balance
(change in
million $)
EV welfare
(change in
million $)
5.74 0.002 885 847
2.50 0.001 167 94
3.93 0.002 2611 578
0.06 0.012 1308 558
2.35 0.003 115 114
0.23 0.004 132 28
1.11 0.001 155 28
0.87 0.010 201 226
1.29 0.008 29 49
2.51 0.008 471 294
3.58 0.010 1009 243
1.33 0.004 55 156
7.76 0.013 4629 706
3.71 0.002 532 307
4.31 0.009 101 160
0.42 0.002 49 0
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Table 3 – % Variations in production levels (scenario 1)
USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM SAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA ROW
Rice 1.10 3.85 3.06 0.09 1.04 1.41 0.08 0.62 0.68 0.08 0.44 0.02 0.14 12.59 0.09 0.00
Wheat 3.27 5.07 0.75 3.46 6.13 0.30 0.56 1.11 1.35 0.87 2.15 2.79 4.92 0.46 0.95 0.11
Other cereals and crops 0.14 2.27 0.84 1.93 1.89 0.47 1.28 1.39 0.8 1.22 0.77 1.67 7.61 13.05 1.20 0.62
Vegetables and fruits 1.59 0.83 0.35 0.26 0.89 0.05 0.41 0.32 0.54 0.15 0.39 0.13 0.87 0.11 0.34 0.08
Animals 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.31 0.12 1.77 0.07 0.00 0.05
Forestry 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.39 0.35 0.17 0.19
Fishing 0.05 0.1 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.03
Coal 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.31 0.07 0.02
Oil 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.32 0.02 0.36 0.32 0.07 0.05
Gas 0.19 0.12 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.08 1.04 0.06 0.08
Refined oil products 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.06
Electricity 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.3 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.01
Water distribution 0.57 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.5 0.07 0.41 4.58 0.05 0.03
Energy intensive industries 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.27 0.04 0.1 0.07 0.03 0.13 0.44 0.16 0.73 0.90 0.20 0.05
Other industries and services 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.26 0.31 0.13 0.05
Market services 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.01
Non market services 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.66 0.03 0.73 0.18 0.02 0.01
Table 4 – % Variations in production levels (scenario 1): partial equilibrium
USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM SAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA ROW
Rice 1.08 5.13 2.84 0.14 1.38 1.39 0.07 0.60 0.86 0.15 0.57 0.06 0.42 13.78 0.03 0.04
Wheat 3.06 5.76 0.68 2.89 6.04 0.28 0.50 0.87 1.53 0.85 1.97 2.83 4.71 1.38 0.90 0.16
Other cereals and crops 0.45 3.31 0.78 1.94 2.15 0.44 1.25 1.23 1.28 1.32 1.24 2.31 7.37 12.77 1.24 0.64
Vegetables and fruits 1.64 1.87 0.40 0.46 1.80 0.09 0.56 0.36 0.95 0.24 0.88 0.58 1.63 0.76 0.51 0.18
Animals 0.02 0.89 0.20 0.17 0.71 0.14 0.30 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.81 0.34 2.24 0.52 0.09 0.12
Forestry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fishing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Refined oil products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electricity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Water distribution 0.59 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.98 0.07 0.84 5.03 0.09 0.04
Energy intensive industries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other industries and services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Market services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nonmarket services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 5 – Scenario 2: Sustainable water supply constraints
Water
demand
(%)
Water rent (mln $ per billion m3 of
water)
Virtual water
trade balance
(change in
billion m3)
GDP
(%)
Trade
balance
(change in
million $)
EV welfare
(change in
million $)
Agricultural
sector
Water
distribution
USA 1.58 11.25 3.82 4.58 0.002 1271 1270
CAN 2.49 0.00 0.00 3.34 0.001 229 124
WEU 0.99 0.00 0.00 7.56 0.004 3742 1200
JPK 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.012 1922 424
ANZ 4.01 0.00 0.00 2.91 0.003 158 150
EEU 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.006 155 59
FSU 0.65 0.00 0.00 1.81 0.005 181 105
MDE 1.38 0.00 0.00 1.47 0.013 250 349
CAM 1.02 0.00 0.00 1.84 0.012 31 68
SAM 0.91 0.00 0.00 4.86 0.012 622 527
SAS 1.58 4.73 0.31 3.18 0.010 1037 196
SEA 0.24 0.00 0.00 2.14 0.004 77 147
CHI 3.92 29.32 1.17 7.52 0.011 4703 711
NAF 44.00 17.86 14.68 22.01 0.882 2932 3388
SSA 1.36 0.00 0.00 10.05 0.017 121 282
ROW 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.004 66 10
WAT E R R E S E A R C H 41 ( 2007 ) 1799 – 18131806industrial sectors and countries. The USA also gain, despite
the fact that its water supply is constrained. This is because
the loss of agricultural exports is more than offset by its gains
in industrial exports. Moreover, the model has the full suite of
current market distortions through tariffs and subsidies.
Constraints on the US water supply reduce agricultural
overproduction, and welfare rises as a result.
Table 3 shows production levels. In water constrained
regions, cereal production and industrial and domestic water
use fall; in other regions, the opposite effect occurs, in most
cases. The production of vegetable and fruits, and of animals,
may go up or down. The production of non-water intensive
goods and services mainly decreases in the non-constrained
regions.
Table 4 shows the effects of water scarcity in the partial
equilibrium simulation.3 The changes in output are very
similar to those in the general equilibrium (for the con-
strained sectors). In the water-constrained countries, produc-
tion falls slightly more under the partial equilibrium than
under the general equilibrium. The sign is as expected: Input
substitution is limited in partial equilibrium. The small size
reflects that water and food are necessary inputs, and
substitution in consumption is limited too.
Table 5 reports the simulation results of scenario 2, where
we increase the water constraint for NAF to 44%. Compared to
scenario 1, notice that a more severe water reduction in one
region, leads not only to a higher water rent in that particular3 For the partial equilibrium simulation we followed the
procedure in Hertel (1997, Chapter 11). Particularly, we put (1)
output prices and quantities supplied by water-intensive indus-
tries as endogenous; (2) output prices and quantities supplied by
the other industries as exogenous; (3) primary factor prices and
quantities as endogenous; (4) water quantities as exogenous and
water rents as endogenous.region, but in other constrained regions as well. Water
demand in unconstrained regions is also higher, to sustain
the increase in imports of water-intensive products in the
constrained countries. Furthermore, a higher water supply
constraint enforces the effects on the virtual water trade
balance. Overall, in scenario 2, NAF is worse off than in
scenario 1, both in terms of welfare and real GDP, as expected.
Welfare losses increase tenfold, even though the supply
constraint goes up by a factor of less than five. Although
many other regions are actually better off, because NAF is
relatively less competitive, the loss in welfare in NAF
substantially decreases the world welfare. This suggests that
any country aiming at sustainable water supply should
reduce the supply gradually rather than instantaneously.
JPK is one of the regions that is better off. Although it pays
more for its agricultural imports, its industrial exports
increase; the latter effect dominates.
In the third scenario, we assume that water is sector specific,
that is, water is immobile between agricultural sectors. In
addition, aswater is nested at the upper level in the production
function of thewater intensive goods and services, it cannot be
substituted with other inputs in the production processes. The
difference in the resulting marginal water rents in these
sectors is related to their water intensity coefficients. In less
water-intensive sectors, such as animal husbandry, the
marginal water rents rise more than in scenario 1 (see Table
6). Animal husbandry needs less water per unit of output than
do crops. The price increase is particularly pronounced for NAF
with a water price of $63/m3 of water for a 10% fall in water
supply, four orders of magnitude higher than in the previous
scenarios. This follows from the fact that water is already used
very efficiently in this sector and region, while demand is
inelastic. Note that the water price is still only 6 Cent/L. In
general, NAF, SAS and CHI import more virtual water than in
scenario 1. Furthermore, they shift their domestic production
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Table 6 – Scenario 3: water sector specific
Water
demand
(%)
Water rent (million $ per billion m3 of water) Virtual
water trade
balance
(change in
billion m3)
GDP
(%)
Trade
balance
(change
in
million
$)
EV
welfare
(change
in
million
$)
Rice Wheat Other
cereals
and
crops
Vegetables
and fruits
Animals Water
distribution
USA 1.58 11.08 8.04 10.48 9.97 597.23 3.81 4.74 0.002 1086 900
CAN 2.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.87 0.001 312 154
WEU 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.47 0.007 5252 1639
JPK 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.003 3166 389
ANZ 2.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.005 230 170
EEU 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.009 275 74
FSU 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.01 0.004 279 87
MDE 1.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.68 0.012 463 338
CAM 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.13 0.009 141 48
SAM 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.66 0.011 923 416
SAS 1.58 5.71 2.37 5.08 8.37 20.35 0.33 3.75 0.016 1484 289
SEA 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.13 0.002 140 74
CHI 3.92 62.57 18.08 12.44 54.89 53.65 1.18 5.57 0.008 7998 1601
NAF 10.00 6.38 31.10 4.45 100.85 63585.53 2.58 9.82 0.136 3110 1311
SSA 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.96 0.013 204 219
ROW 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.006 121 30
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Table 7 – Scenario 4: No water price sensitivity
Water
demand
(%)
Water rent (million $ per billion
m3 of water)
Virtual water
trade balance
(change in
billion m3)
GDP
(%)
Trade
balance
(change in
million $)
EV welfare
(change in
million $)
Agricultural
sector
Water
distribution
USA 1.58 12.78 10.40 7.20 0.002 1408 1242
CAN 2.83 0.00 0.00 3.75 0.001 272 153
WEU 0.73 0.00 0.00 5.51 0.004 4304 991
JPK 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.017 2243 768
ANZ 5.23 0.00 0.00 3.86 0.004 190 188
EEU 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.007 226 49
FSU 0.62 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.000 270 29
MDE 1.15 0.00 0.00 1.22 0.014 357 336
CAM 1.01 0.00 0.00 1.76 0.012 71 67
SAM 0.67 0.00 0.00 3.57 0.012 777 452
SAS 1.58 7.79 0.76 6.73 0.030 1868 530
SEA 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.75 0.005 47 231
CHI 3.92 41.43 6.86 11.57 0.001 7863 1418
NAF 10.00 6.00 5.22 4.07 0.012 596 395
SSA 0.86 0.00 0.00 6.22 0.014 171 252
ROW 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.004 85 5
4 Although, in a single country CGE, there is either an explicit
‘‘rest of the world’’ region or the rest of the world in implicitly
included in the closure rules.
WAT E R R E S E A R C H 41 ( 2007 ) 1799 – 18131808to water-extensive goods and services, which also increases
imports of such goods, leading to gains in the terms of trade.
Compared to scenario 1, the restriction of the water mobility
increases slightly the competitiveness of the other countries,
resulting in a higher GDP. Immobile water resources lead
to a lower loss of global welfare. This is surprising. The welfare
of most regions is lower in scenario 3 than in scenario 1, as
one would expect. The two main exceptions are WEU and JPK.
Both regions improve their terms of trade, as industrial
exports increase. Without water supply constraints, WEU also
enjoys a competitive advantage in agriculture. Allocative
welfare also improves in both regions, as regional and world
prices for agricultural products converge. Note that global
welfare in fact increases in scenario 3: the current agricultural
economy is so distorted that a reduction in production
improves welfare.
Scenario 4 considers the same case as scenario 1, but the
water intensity does not respond to the price of water price;
that is, the water intensity parameters are the same between
the base and the policy scenario in all sectors. This signifies
less flexibility at the level of farms and water distribution
companies. Water rents are higher than in scenario 1, and the
difference is more pronounced in water price sensitive
countries such as CHI and SAS, and, for the same reason, in
the water distribution industry (see Table 7). Furthermore, as
the constrained countries cannot improve their water effi-
ciency in domestic production, they satisfy their demand of
water-intensive products by increasing the imports more
than in scenario 1, as the results in terms of virtual water
trade indicate. NAF, CHI and SAS gain in terms of trade due to
their increase of exports of water-extensive products. As the
world welfare decreases in scenario 4 more than it does in
scenario 1, the world would benefit from a policy, which leads
to higher water efficiency.Scenario 5 is based on the ‘‘non-market’’ mechanism, that
is, water users cannot reap the increase in resource rents or,
equivalently, the water tax is not recycled. In this scenario,
productivity is decreased so as to meet the water supply
constraints, which are the same as in scenario 1. The
resulting productivity changes differ between agriculture
and water distribution services, and amongst the constrained
regions (see Table 8). Productivity decreases faster in more
water-intensive sectors than in scenario 1. The pattern of
variations in the virtual water balance are as in scenario 1, but
the absolute changes are greater. The global loss in welfare is
considerably larger, even though some regions gain more. In
the non-market scenario, each region with a supply con-
straint, including the USA, loses welfare.6. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we present a computable general equilibrium
model of the world economy with water as an explicit factor of
production. To an experienced CGE modeller, it should be
known how to include an extra production factor—in principle.
This paper contributes by doing this—in practice. Previously,
this was not possible because the necessary data were
missing—at least at the global scale, as water is a non-market
good, not reported in national economic accounts. Earlier
studies included water resources at the national or smaller
scale. These studies necessarily miss the international dimen-
sion,4 which is important as water is implicitly traded in
international markets, mainly for agricultural products.
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Table 8 – Scenario 5: Non-market solution
Water
demand
(%)
Technical augmenting change
(%)
Virtual water
trade balance
(change in
billion m3)
GDP
(%)
Trade
balance
(change in
million $)
EV welfare
(change in
million $)
Agricultural
sector
Water
distribution
USA 1.58 3.08 4.15 8.74 0.131 816 9439
CAN 3.42 0.00 0.00 4.02 0.004 369 170
WEU 1.06 0.00 0.00 6.88 0.005 5642 1193
JPK 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.013 3180 415
ANZ 4.28 0.00 0.00 2.97 0.003 230 193
EEU 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.007 239 57
FSU 0.99 0.00 0.00 3.29 0.005 263 146
MDE 1.73 0.00 0.00 2.10 0.027 264 756
CAM 1.23 0.00 0.00 2.08 0.017 51 105
SAM 0.85 0.00 0.00 4.54 0.014 970 550
SAS 1.58 4.96 1.93 7.22 1.796 2171 9782
SEA 0.48 0.00 0.00 2.07 0.007 91 342
CHI 3.92 9.02 29.58 13.18 2.533 8621 26292
NAF 10.00 14.22 13.99 8.35 3.462 1418 7688
SSA 1.08 0.00 0.00 8.53 0.014 191 263
ROW 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.004 87 2
WATER RESEARCH 41 (2007) 1799– 1813 1809In our model, sector specific water resources are introduced
as production factors in the agricultural sectors and the water
distribution service sector. Water is mobile between the
different agricultural sectors, but immobile between agricul-
ture and the water distribution service sector (which delivers
water to the rest of the economic sectors). As water is mainly
required for agricultural production, we disaggregated agri-
cultural production into five different sectors. This allows us
to gain a wider insight into the implications of different water
resource policies. In the model, water use is also country
specific, as are water resources. This allows for differentiated
responses, in which some countries specialize in water-
intensive agricultural products.
We illustrate the newmodel by studying the implications of
increased water scarcity, with a particular focus on ground-
water resources. Other applications can be thought of, and we
are working on a number of them. The excess use of
groundwater resources is an unambiguous example of future
reductions in water supply, either through policy or through
nature, as the reservoirs are depleted. Computable general
equilibrium models are best at analyzing structural economic
change. In this case, the change is a regionally and sectorally
differentiated fall in water supply.
In the base scenario, we restrict water supply in some
regions, but not in others. As expected, water use increases in
the unconstrained regions as trade patterns shift; uncon-
strained regions produce and export more water-intensive
products. The world as a whole is worse off, as production is
constrained. However, some countries gain, as relative prices
change. Interestingly, the USA is among the winners even
though its water supply is constrained as well. This is partly
due to distortionary subsidization of agricultural production
in the USA; water constraints temper the resulting over-
production.If water constraints are higher, so are welfare gains and
losses; however, welfare gains respond less than proportion-
ally, and welfare losses more than proportionally. Shifts in
trade patterns are also larger. If water is less mobile, the
economy has less ability to adapt, and water constraints have
a more negative welfare impact in most regions. At the same
time, regional welfare gains are more pronounced as well, so
redistribution is amplified. In fact, the positive effects
dominate the negative effects, so that global welfare in-
creases; this is a sign that current agricultural markets are
severely distorted. If water use is less flexible, the negative
effects dominate. If water users cannot reap the higher rents
induced by water scarcity (alternatively, if the government
does not recycle the water tax), overall welfare losses are
much higher, but again, so are the welfare gains in some of
the regions that benefit. The USA, however, would be net
losers in this scenario. Even though the physical input
scenario is identical in 4 out of 5 scenarios, the realignment
of agricultural trade is different in all cases; as a result, the
actual water use is unique to each scenario.
This analysis needs to be extended in several ways and a
number of limitations apply. First, we have not been able to
allocate industrial water use to its different users. We rather
used a simplifying assumption that water for domestic and
industry use is supplied by the water service sector. The price
is the same for all industries (except agriculture). Second, we
consider regional water supply, implicitly assuming that there
is a perfect water market and costless water transport within
each region. Sector-specific water resources allow for sub-
regional differentiation of water resources, but only to a
limited extent. Third, we were not able to differentiate
between the different qualities of water supplied. Some of
the difference is captured by defining sector-specific water,
but not all. Fourth, in our model we assume that water is used
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Table A1 – Aggregations in GTAP-W
A. Regional aggregation C. Sectoral aggregation
1. USA—United States 1. Rice—rice
2. CAN—Canada 2. Wheat—wheat
3. WEU—Western Europe 3. CerCrops—other cereals and crops
4. JPK—Japan and Korea 4. VegFruits—vegetable, fruits
5. ANZ—Australia and New Zealand 5. Animals—Animals
6. EEU—Eastern Europe 6. Forestry—forestry
7. FSU—Former Soviet Union 7. Fishing—fishing
8. MDE—Middle East 8. Coal—coal mining
9. CAM—Central America 9. Oil—oil
10. SAM—South America 10. Gas—natural gas extraction
11. SAS—South Asia 11. Oil_pcts—refined oil products
12. SEA—Southeast Asia 12. Electricity—electricity
13. CHI—China 13. Water—water collection, purification and distribution services
14. NAF—North Africa 14. En_Int_ind—energy intensive Industries
15. SSA—Sub-Saharan Africa 15. Oth_ind—other industry and services
16. ROW—Rest of the world 16. MServ—market services
17. NMServ—non-market services
B. Endowments
1. Land
2. Labour
3. Capital
4. Natural Resource
Table A2 – Regional characteristics
Population GDP/
cap
Renewable
water
resourcea
Water
use
Water intensity
in agriculturec
Water
intensity
otherd
Water
imports
Water
exports
million $ 109m3/year m3109/
personb
109m3/year m3/$ m3/$ 109m3 109m3
USA 276 28,786 3069 11,120 479 2.9 3.7 57 125
CAN 30 20,572 2902 96,733 46 4.3 5.2 8 51
WEU 388 24,433 2227 5740 227 2.6 3.5 256 96
JPK 172 35,603 500 2907 107 1.4 1.6 82 0
ANZ 22 21,052 819 37,227 26 4.1 1.2 3 30
CEE 121 2996 494 4083 60 3.3 13.6 19 6
FSU 291 1556 4730 16,254 284 9.1 28.0 27 61
MDE 227 3150 483 2128 206 4.9 6.8 35 19
CAM 128 2938 1183 9242 101 5.2 13.6 25 31
LAM 332 4830 12,246 36,886 164 3.9 5.9 35 68
SAS 1289 416 3685 2859 918 9.8 47.5 21 25
SEA 638 4592 5266 8254 279 10.1 12.8 58 35
CHI 1274 790 2897 2274 630 3.6 38.5 33 16
NAF 135 1284 107 793 95 8.5 39.5 27 4
SSA 605 563 4175 6901 113 11.4 6.4 14 132
ROW 42 3338 2984 71,048 75 4.7 2.7 6 8
a 2001 estimates taken from Aquastat.
b UN criterion for water resource scarcity degree: slightly scarce (1700–3000), middle scarce (1000–1700), severe scarcity (500–1000) and most
severe scarcity (o500).
c Average water intensity covering crop/plant growth and animal production measured in water use/$ output. Numbers differ considerably
between countries and sectors. Note that water use includes the use of different kind of sources; rain, soil moisture and irrigation water.
However, farmers pay for irrigation water only.
d Note that in some countries only a low number of persons is connected to a distribution network. In others a number of self-supplied
industries are not connected. However, both are included as users of the services the water distribution network provides. As a consequence,
water use per $ of output is overstated in the above table.
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WATER RESEARCH 41 (2007) 1799– 1813 1811efficiently and no water is wasted. The water intensity
coefficient captures some differences, but these differences
do not respond to price or other signals, except to the price of
water. Fifth, for the agricultural sector, we used irrigation
water plus rainfall, without distinction. Sixth, we nested
water at the upper level in the production function of the
water intensive goods and services, so that water cannot be
substituted with specific inputs in the production processes.
Seventh, we used a single data set for water use and water
resources, ignoring the uncertainties in the data. All this is
deferred to future research.Acknowledgments
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The economic rent associated with water resources (WRR)
has beenmodelled as an output tax (subsidy); the formulation
follows the GTAP standard. If there is no water scarcity, we
have WRR ¼ 0. If water is scarce, the economic rents
associated with water resources drive a wedge between the
market price (PM) and the agents’ price (PS). This wedge is
called the power of the water rent and it is calculated as
follows:
WRPði; rÞ ¼ VOMði; rÞ VWRði; rÞ
VOMði; rÞ , (A.1)
where, for any commodity i in region r, we have that WRP(i,r)
is the power of the water rent, VOM(i,r) is the value of output
evaluated at market price and VWR(i,r) is the value of the
water rent, that is the quantity of water resources (km3)
multiplied by the water rent per km3.
In the initial equilibrium, the water rent (WRR0) is equal to
zero, and the agents’ price (PS0) and the market price (PM0)
coincide. Thus, the power of the rent is equal to 1. If the water
rent increases (decreases), the power of the water rent
becomes smaller (higher) than 1. This affects the supply price.
The relation between supply prices, market prices, output
taxes and the economic rent associated with water resources
is as follows:
psði; rÞ ¼ pmði; rÞ þ toði; rÞ þwrpði; rÞ, (A.2)
where, for any commodity i in region r, we have that pm(i,r) is
the percentage change in the market price PM, ps(i,r) is the
percentage change in the supply price, to (i,r) is the percentage
change in the power of the output tax, and wrp(i,r) is the
percentage change in the power of the economic rent
associated with water resources. If the water rent increases,
the power of the water rent falls, and the wedge between the
supply price and the market price grows.
The water demand by industry i in region r is sensitive to
the change of the supply price due to the change of the water
rent as follows:
qwtði; rÞ ¼ qoði; rÞ  ði; rÞwrpði; rÞ, (A.3)where for any commodity i in region r, we have that qwt(i,r) is
the percentage change in the water demand, qo(i,r) is the
percentage change of the output and e(i,r) is the water price
sensitivity.
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